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Summary: In a new study, Ben-Haim et al. use subliminal stimuli to separate conscious and 
unconscious perception in macaques. A programme of this type, using a range of cognitive 
tasks, is a promising way to look for conscious perception in more controversial cases. 
 
 
The search for animal consciousness 
Conscious experience raises some of the thorniest problems in science. Where in the brain are 
its neural circuits? What is its adaptive function? When did it evolve? Which animals are 
conscious and which are not? Many biologists set these questions aside as too difficult to 
answer. However, the last few decades have seen the advent of a science of human 
consciousness that employs a battery of methods to probe the neural and cognitive signatures 
of conscious experience. This raises the tantalizing prospect of drawing on techniques from 
consciousness science to gain insight into consciousness in other animals. 
 
Where should we start? A tempting proposition is that we should look for neuronal correlates 
of consciousness (or “NCCs”) in other animals, just as consciousness researchers have looked 
for human NCCs. This, however, is fraught with difficulty. The search for the human NCCs 
has not yet generated any consensus. Even if there were a consensus, we would not know 
what alternative implementations may be possible, and it would be hasty to assume that the 
human way of implementing consciousness is the only way. 
 
An alternative approach is to look for cognitive and behavioural abilities linked to 
consciousness, such as certain forms of metacognition and associative learning (Birch 2020). 
However, pitfalls lurk here too. We know from the human case that high-level functions can 
occur unconsciously (Hassin 2013). Humans, for instance, may “drift off” while driving, 
executing the skill without any conscious control. So which behaviours and cognitive 
functions really involve consciousness? 
 
The double-dissociation approach 
In humans, there is a difference between conscious and unconscious perception. When you 
watch a movie, you consciously see the characters. But, if a single frame of something else is 
discreetly slipped in, it may register subliminally. Researchers in consciousness science have 
long exploited this difference to study the distinctive neural and cognitive signatures of 
conscious (as opposed to unconscious) processing. If we could find an analogous difference 
in other species, we could study the signatures of conscious processing in those species too. 
 
A recent study by Ben-Haim et al. (2021) attempts exactly this. One way to disentangle 
conscious from unconscious processing in humans involves crossover double dissociation 
paradigms (Dehaene 2014). These tasks present pairs of consciously visible (supraliminal) 
and subliminal stimuli that elicit opposite behavioural responses. For example, subjects might 
be shown a reference word (e.g., “SPICE”) either supraliminally or subliminally. They must 
then complete a word stem (e.g., “SPI…”) without using the reference word. When the 
reference is supraliminal, subjects tend to correctly give a different word (e.g., “SPIKE”). 
When the reference is subliminal, subjects tend to incorrectly give the reference word. 
 
Although that example involves language, the general idea does not require it. Ben-Haim et 
al. (2021) tested a crossover double dissociation paradigm on four rhesus macaques (Macaca 
mulatta), which were compared with 145 adult humans. The paradigm was a spatial cueing 
task, where subjects must locate a target stimulus displayed at one of two locations on a 
screen. Preceding the target was a predictive cue that appeared at the opposite location to the 
target. Such a cue is called an “incongruent” cue. These incongruent cues were presented 
either supraliminally (for 250 ms) or subliminally (for 17 or 33 ms). 
 
The authors hypothesised that conscious perception would facilitate learning, with subjects 
shown supraliminal cues learning the incongruent rule and locating the target faster than at 
chance level. Conversely, they hypothesized that stimuli perceived nonconsciously would 
attract attention without facilitating learning, impairing task performance. The authors thus 
predicted slower responses than at chance level for the subliminal cues. Such findings would 
show a “double dissociation”: conscious processing improving performance and 
nonconscious processing impairing performance. 
 
As predicted, both humans and macaques located the target faster following supraliminal 
cues than subliminal cues. When presented supraliminally, the incongruent cues also 
generated faster reaction-times than non-predictive cues, whereas subliminal incongruent 
cues generated slower reaction-times than subliminal non-predictive cues. Human subjects 
reported not having seen the subliminal cues, confirming that they were processed 
nonconsciously. Conscious and nonconscious processing, therefore, generated opposite 
response patterns in this spatial-cueing task: supraliminal cues facilitated performance; 
subliminal cues interfered with performance. This double dissociation was strikingly similar 
in humans and macaques. 
 
The confounding influence of signal strength 
Supraliminal cues are stronger signals, and thus potentially easier to learn about, than 
subliminal cues. In other words, improved learning performance may have nothing to do with 
stimuli being consciously perceived and may simply be explained by the stimuli being 
stronger to begin with. The possible confounding effect of signal strength is a persistent issue 
in consciousness science (Lau 2011).  
 
Ben-Haim et al. addressed this using two strategies. First, they informed some human 
subjects about the subliminal cues partway through the forced-choice experiment. Many 
subjects subsequently reported seeing the cues and performed nearly as well as in the 
supraliminal condition. Informing subjects did not increase signal strength, but nonetheless 
improved performance. This suggests that cue awareness, rather than signal strength, explains 
the opposite results for supraliminal and subliminal cues. 
 
Second, in a further variation, human subjects were informed from the outset that incongruent 
cues predicted the target’s location, so that no learning was needed. The response pattern 
persisted: subjects still performed above chance when they reported seeing the cue and below 
chance when they reported not seeing the cue.  
 
A critic may object: this is evidence that the dissociation was not due to signal strength alone 
in humans, but it does not rule out this alternative explanation in macaques. Implicitly, Ben-
Haim et al. bridge this gap with an argument from analogy. They assume that, given the close 
similarities between humans and macaques, an alternative explanation which is implausible 
for humans is also implausible for macaques.  
 
That argument from analogy is persuasive, but only against a background of substantial 
neurobiological similarity between humans and macaques—a background that makes the 
attribution of consciousness to macaques extremely plausible to begin with. A case for 
conscious perception in a more controversial candidate—such as bees, crabs, or octopuses—
would have to avoid such a move. In the case of bees, our imagined critic would argue that 
ruling out an alternative explanation based on signal strength in humans does not rule it out in 
bees. 
 
Looking for systematic facilitation 
Does the signal strength problem have a more widely applicable solution? We see this as an 
urgent question for animal consciousness research. Here is one proposal: by varying stimulus 
duration (or contrast) continuously, we could use the double-dissociation paradigm to identify 
a putative subliminal/supraliminal threshold—usually called a “subjective threshold”—in our 
target species. Suppose we found evidence of a putative subjective threshold at around 50ms, 
marked by a step change in task performance. We could then ask: do we find this same 
putative subjective threshold across a range of tasks? In particular, do we find this threshold 
effect not just in spatial cuing but also in other abilities linked to conscious perception in 
humans, such as metacognition, trace conditioning, cross-modal learning, reversal learning, 
and the interpretation of three-dimensional scenes?  
 
Finding the same threshold effect across many abilities would be compelling evidence that a 
distinctive kind of processing systematically facilitates the same range of abilities that 
conscious processing facilitates in humans. Our imagined critic would have to resort to the 
idea that increasing signal strength could still produce the same threshold effect across a 
range of tasks for some other reason—an idea that becomes ever more unlikely as the number 
and diversity of tasks increases. 
 
Evidence for a subjective threshold would be convincing evidence for a distinction between 
conscious and unconscious perception in the target animal. We think it would be convincing 
even without a background of substantial neurobiological similarity—even, that is, for bees, 
crabs, or octopuses. So a priority for animal consciousness research is exploring whether 
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